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FOREWORD
The ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has led to a variety
of new and important questions about the evolution of Iraqi society and
national identity. These questions concerning how Iraqis view themselves
have serious implications for the U.S. military presence in Iraq which
remains in the aftermath of Saddam’s removal. A new Iraqi nationalism or
sectarian chauvinism may feed anti-U.S. efforts and actions, endangering
U.S. troops and disrupting Iraqi reconstruction. It is correspondingly vital
that Iraqi nationalism does not begin to define itself with anti-Americanism
as a major component.
This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, addresses the critical
questions involved in understanding the background of Iraqi national
identity and the ways in which it may evolve in the future to either the
favor or detriment of the United States. The monograph also provides
particular attention to the issue of Iraqi sectarianism and the emerging role
of the Shi’ite Muslims, noting the power of an emerging but fractionalized
clergy. The result is a thoughtful and probing report including policy
recommendations for U.S. military and civilian decisionmakers that helps
to illuminate the complex subjects of Iraqi nationalism and sectarianism
and their relevance to the U.S. presence in Iraq.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a
contribution to the national security debate on this important subject at this
juncture of our nation’s history as it grapples with a variety of problems
associated with rebuilding Iraq. This analysis should be particularly
valuable to U.S. military strategic leaders as they seek to better understand
Iraq political culture. Additionally, the background information provided
should be of great value to those involved in duties associated with the
U.S. presence in Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has opened
the path to a new future for Iraqis, although it is not yet certain what
direction that future will take. Iraq is a fragile political entity created
in the aftermath of World War I through the involuntary union of
ethnically and religiously diverse portions of the former Ottoman
Empire. In the years following Iraq’s creation, a nascent nationalism
emerged, which successive leaders sought to nurture and encourage.
This effort culminated in Saddam Hussein’s efforts to generate a
radical Iraq-centered form of Arab nationalism, which served to
promote loyalty to the state and more importantly to Saddam.
The U.S.-Iraqi War of 2003 did not emerge as a strong test
of Iraqi nationalism. While Saddam did have some committed
defenders, large segments of the population remained neutral in
the confrontation between the U.S.-led coalition and Saddam’s
defenders. After the war, the United States emerged as a power on
probation with the Iraqi population, many of whom were uncertain
that their well-being was a major factor in the U.S. decision to
intervene and remain in Iraq. Anti-American conspiracy theories
became widespread in Iraq, while conservative Muslims worried
about the corrupting influence of perceived Western vices.
The removal of Saddam’s regime created problems and
opportunities for Iraqi ethnic and religious communities. Arab
Shi’ites, who comprise the majority of the population, saw new
opportunities for political leadership, perhaps with a powerful but
fragmented clergy leading the way. Sunni Arabs correspondingly
worried about a new distribution of power, and many began to
view de-Baathification as a process that further threatens their
community. Kurds remain interested in de facto, but not formal,
independence from Iraq, and the danger of an Arab backlash to
Kurdish aspirations is correspondingly serious. Tribal identities
further complicate the situation.
Some attacks against U.S. forces have occurred following the war
with most of the violence associated with residual Saddam loyalists
v

from among the Sunni Arab community. Many Shi’ites are more
reluctant to engage in such activity so long as it appears that they
can take power by political means. Nevertheless, strong anti-U.S.
views are present in the pro-Iranian Shi’ite organizations, and these
views may spread among other Shi’ites over time. The possibility of
confrontations between U.S. troops and hostile crowds is particularly
worrisome as is the availability of massive quantities of weapons to
the Iraqi population.
In light of this situation, the United States needs to search
continually for areas of agreement with the nonextremist clergy
while also recognizing issues on which collaboration is not possible.
U.S. leaders must also support a continued strong information
campaign, expand efforts to challenge Iranian activities in Iraq,
and provide troops with extensive training in stabilization and
occupation duties. The participation of troops from moderate Arab
and Muslim states in stabilization and reconstruction activities is
important and should be encouraged. U.S. administrators must also
be careful how they use the word de-Baathification since some Baath
ideals are not inherently anti-democratic, although the party itself
was deeply corrupted by Saddam. Finally, any U.S. efforts to achieve
long-term dominance of Iraqi politics can be expected to produce a
serious backlash.
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NATIONALISM, SECTARIANISM, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

I am going to teach the South American Republics to elect
good men.
Woodrow Wilson1
A man may build for himself a throne of bayonets, but he
cannot sit on it.
William Ralph Inge2
My brother and myself against my cousin. My cousin and
myself against the foreigner.
Arab Proverb popular in Iraq3

Introduction.
The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime by a U.S.-led
military force has opened the path to a variety of alternative futures
for Iraq. The preferred option for the West is the creation of a secular,
constitutional democracy, although it is deeply unclear that such an
entity can be established and then survive in the turbulent milieu
of Iraqi politics. A less desirable possibility that may still serve
U.S. interests would be the rise of a pro-Western military authority
figure who nevertheless displays some respect for human rights.
An alternative that the United States considers unacceptable is
the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic supported
predominantly by the Iraqi Shi’ites.
The preferred option of most Iraqis is not yet fully clear.
Moreover, the type of regime change that they support will have
a great deal to do with how they define their own identities in a
postwar environment. In the aftermath of Saddam’s ouster, Iraqis
must determine how to order and emphasize their national and
subnational identities now that unconditional loyalty to an entity
1

called “Iraq” is no longer proscribed by a totalitarian government.
They must further decide if their ethnic and religious identities are
complementary or antithetical to their identities as Iraqis. Moreover,
they must consider to what extent pan-Arab values exist and if these
values should be important to their lives.
Iraqis also must decide if their national, subnational, or panArab identity will allow them to accept the concept of a friendly
relationship with the United States as well as a U.S. presence in Iraq
and throughout the Middle East. Does friendship with the United
States require them to be “bad” Arabs (for those Iraqis who are
Arabs), bad Muslims, or bad Iraqis? Conversely, is cooperation with
the West acceptable to help build a new and more prosperous Iraq?
Moreover, can a pious Islamic government or an Arab nationalist
leadership coexist with a U.S. presence in Iraq or support the
development of Western style institutions?
The Emergence of Iraqi Nationalism.
Considerations of the Iraqi national identity and its implications
for the future must begin with an understanding of the background
of the Iraqi state and the competing national, subnational, and
transnational sources of individual identity. Iraqis may choose
to define themselves ethnically (Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, etc.),
religiously (Sunnis, Shi’ites, etc.), nationally as Iraqis, or locally as
members of a tribe or tribal confederation. The decision on which
identity to emphasize may often depend on current conditions and
will be based to some extent on Iraqi history, which therefore needs
to be examined as it relates to these identities.
While Mesopotamia has been home for a variety of proud and
ancient civilizations, Iraq itself is a relatively new nation-state. It was
formed by the British out of the former Ottoman Turkish vilayets
of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul following World War I.4 Previously,
these provinces were ruled directly by the Ottoman Turks, and
had few political or economic interactions with each other.5 One
scholar, in describing this arrangement, has called Iraq a British
“administrative convenience” lumped together without serious
thought given to its eventual viability as an independent nation.6
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that many of the
inhabitants of each vilayet were angry about being incorporated into
the new state. The population of the Kurdish-dominated vilayet of
Mosul considered its inclusion in the new state as a betrayal of great
power promises of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Sevres.7
Leaders of the Shi’ite province of Basra rightly suspected that their
own interests would be subordinated to the less numerous but more
politically powerful Sunni Muslims in Baghdad. This situation was
particularly galling since the Sunnis did not have a higher standard
of education or any other significant qualifications entitling them to
a leadership role in the new political entity. Instead, the Sunni Arabs
were simply more interested in cooperation with the British as a way
of insuring the well-being of their own community.
Tribal uprisings and isolated acts of terrorism against British
troops were problems from early in the occupation. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the greatest resistance to the new government came
from Shi’ite clerics hostile to rule by Sunni Muslims supported by a
foreign power. These clerics proclaimed a jihad against British forces
from the Shi’ite holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq. This call to
arms led to a major uprising among the Shi’ite tribes. The situation
stabilized in February 1921 only after the British had suffered around
2,000 casualties.8
Tensions among the Iraqi communities were therefore severe
but were also viewed as controllable by a strong central government
supported by the British.9 The first Iraqi government was led by
the Hashemite King Feisal who was installed by the British from
the Hejaz (western section of Saudi Arabia) based on his wartime
alliance with them. As an important Arab nationalist leader, Feisal
had some popularity across the Middle East, although it is uncertain
how much of this extended to Iraq. His position in Iraq was later
confirmed by a questionable Iraqi referendum welcoming him as
king.10
Feisal, at times, appeared less than enamored of the Iraqi people.
Before assuming authority in Iraq, Feisal told his friend, Colonel
T.E. Lawrence of the British Army, that Iraqis were “unimaginable
masses of human beings, devoid of any national consciousness or
sense of unity, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities,
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receptive to evil, prone to anarchy, and always willing to rise
against the government.”11 Clearly, Feisal considered ruling such a
country to be an extremely difficult task. He also began his reign as
an unmistakable client of the United Kingdom, which maintained a
mandate over Iraq until 1932.
Feisal’s style of rule has at times been described as “paternalistic.”
During the mandate years he reached out to ethnic and tribal leaders
with various forms of patronage. The patronage helped to establish
links between himself and local interests, co-opting the latter
into some degree of subordination to the state. The principal gift
associated with this patronage system was land. Thus, in this early
time frame the state “gained definition” and a rudimentary form of
Iraqi nationalism that was compatible with tribal loyalties appears to
have begun moving forward.12
The state further strengthened itself through the assumption
of a host of administrative functions, especially following the
termination of the British mandate and the beginning of Iraq’s
formal independence in 1932. Correspondingly, a variety of teachers,
engineers, health workers, and other civil servants worked directly
for the national government with some bonds of loyalty developing
as a result. Moreover, the establishment and expansion of an Iraqi
national army led to a security force with formal loyalty to the state
above tribe, sect, or ethnicity. Many members of the urban elite also
found a road to social advancement in civilian government service
or membership in the armed forces, especially in the officer corps.13
Iraq’s Hashemite dynasty remained in power until 1958 when
it was ousted by military coup. In the end the regime was widely
regarded as failing to meet the domestic needs of its citizens.
Furthermore, the monarchy was deeply compromised by its
continued ties with the United Kingdom and its opposition to a new
version of pan-Arab nationalism represented by Egyptian President
Gamal Abdul Nasser. Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, the new leader
of Iraq, was warmly welcomed to power by Egypt, one of the first
countries to offer diplomatic recognition to revolutionary Iraq.14
Qassim agreed with Nasser on a variety of important regional
issues and rapidly withdrew Iraq from the Western-oriented defense
treaty known as the Baghdad Pact. He also required the British to
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withdraw their military forces from all Iraqi facilities including
their departure from the large and important Habbaniya Air Base
in 1959. Qassim was friendly to the Soviet Union as was Nasser. He
also gave firebrand speeches against Western imperialism, showing
signs of mass appeal in doing so. Nevertheless, the new leadership
in Baghdad chose not to be led by Egypt or to merge with the
recently formed union of Syria and Egypt designated as the United
Arab Republic (1958-61). Soon the cold war between revolutionary
Iraq and revolutionary Egypt was more bitter than Egyptian-Iraqi
conflict in the era of the Hashemites. Stunningly, President Nasser
was vilified in the Iraqi press to an even greater degree than the
Israelis.15
Egyptian-Iraqi animosity was based on more than simply
personality differences. Iraq, as a large Arab nation, with a sizable
population, oil wealth, and a proud heritage of ancient civilizations
was not prepared to accept subordinate status as an apprentice
of the Cairo leadership. Iraqi leaders saw their own country as
worthy of respect. In a harbinger of future problems, Brigadier
Qassim also threatened to seize Kuwait through military action
in 1961, maintaining that it was a province of Iraq that had been
severed from the homeland by imperialism. Qassim’s efforts were
thwarted by Egypt and the Arab League which provided troops for
Kuwait’s defense as part of the ongoing struggle between Cairo and
Baghdad.16
In another increasingly familiar pattern Brigadier Qassim was
assassinated in 1963. While his grandiose visions for Iraq could
clearly be called nationalist, his strongest base of power was the
Iraqi Communist party. Post-Qassim Iraqi governments generally
described themselves as based more firmly on Arab nationalism.
Qassim’s government was initially replaced by the Iraqi Baath
party, but this group remained in office for less then a year before
being displaced by a military coup. The Baath party came to power
for the second time in July 1968, serving as the vehicle for Saddam
Hussein’s rise to power.
The Baath party conspirators who took power in Iraq in July
came as the leaders of a secular, pan-Arab party that had been active
throughout the Arab World since the 1940s and had already played
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a major role in Syrian politics (where it would establish firm power
by 1970). Baath itself means “renaissance” or “resurrection.” The
Baath program called for a reestablishment of Arab glory on largely
secular grounds guided by the principles of secular nationalism, antiimperialism, and socialism. Secularism was particularly important
as the Baath was influenced by European ideas on the separation
of religion and politics. Moreover, one of the two co-founders of
the Baath, Michel Aflaq, was a Sorbonne-educated Greek Orthodox
Christian seeking to emphasize Arab culture, language, and history
rather than Islam as the core of a new Arab identity.
While Saddam was to corrupt the Iraqi Baath party into a
subservient instrument of his personal dictatorship, the promise of
a progressive, nationalist, and anti-imperialist future was something
that many Iraqis viewed with hope in 1968. Likewise, the principle of
Sunni, Shi’ite, and Christian Arab equality spoke to the needs of many
members of the population. This principle was also quickly betrayed
by Saddam and his small clique of Sunni Muslim lieutenants. Many
Iraqi Arabs who detest Saddam and his supporters nevertheless
view Baath party principles as at least theoretically correct, and
Baathism as a legitimate ideology that was hijacked by a ruthless
dictator and his criminal supporters. However, as his instrument,
the Baath party was deeply useful to Saddam, and Iraqi ideologues
were able to weave elaborate praise for the system that Saddam
ruled as a neo-Stalinist.
Saddam Hussein and Baathist Versions of Iraqi Nationalism.
Saddam Hussein emerged as a product of Iraqi politics and not an
aberration from that system. By 1968 Saddam had totally internalized
the idea of disciplined violence to control Iraq. Methodically building
the machinery of repression, Saddam formally remained Iraq’s
secondary leader until 1979 when he took full power as president
and absolute dictator.17
Throughout his period in power, Saddam also built one of the
most impressive propaganda machines in the Arab World. While
the chief purpose of this machine was to promote and venerate his
own leadership, it nevertheless had other functions including the
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inculcation of a strong Baathist brand of Iraqi nationalism. Saddam
wanted an Iraqi populace that was deeply loyal to both himself and
the regime version of the nation. The twin goals of the propaganda
machine therefore became the glorification of Saddam’s leadership
and the inculcation of a pride in being Iraqi. “Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is
Saddam” according to a popular regime slogan.18
The regime version of Iraqi history was also used to bolster
Iraqi nationalism throughout Saddam’s dictatorship. This new
history involved an Iraqi-centered form of Arab nationalism which
appropriated and embellished the earlier concepts of Iraq as a natural
leader of the Arab World. In justifying this leading role, Saddam and
his ideologues would argue that modern Iraq was a continuation of
some of the greatest civilizations in ancient history beginning with
Sumer and Akkad, then Babylon, Assyria, Chaldea, and the Abbasid
caliphate.19 Nevertheless, Saddam’s decision to promote Iraq as the
leader of the Arab World was not a totally new policy. Rather, it was
a continuation of the policies of previous Iraqi leaders, albeit in a
more developed and assertive ideological context.
Regime analogies between modern Iraq and ancient Mesopotamia
were also not confined to speeches and rhetoric. A kitsch Babylon
was restored and rebuilt by the regime while a variety of public
buildings were decorated with Babylonian art sometimes including
full-scale replicas of the Ishtar gate. Politically-based museums were
built to honor Nebuchadnezzar and Hammurabi, while a theater
was dedicated to Alexander the Great in commemoration of his time
in Mesopotamia.20
Likewise, Saddam erected modern sculptures throughout
Baghdad representing figures from the Arabian Nights, the
Abbasid caliphate, and the Epic of Gilgamesh. These monuments
complemented an endless supply of Saddam portraits and statues
as well as martial memorials such as a gigantic Unknown Soldier’s
Monument, the Martyrs Monument, the Saddam Victory Arch,
and 80 statues of dead Iraqi officers pointing accusingly at Iran to
commemorate the sacrifices of the Iran-Iraq War. Sometimes the two
motifs were joined with images such as Saddam standing above the
Ishtar Gate or Saddam standing in the company of the great figures
in Mesopotamian history.

7

Saddam also rebuilt the statue of King Feisal I destroyed by
angry crowds on July 14, 1958 to suggest a continuity and forward
movement in Iraqi history and, according to one scholar, to indicate
that the regime was “not afraid of Iraqi history.”21 The decision also
had a practical side as Iraq was improving its relations with the
Hashemite government of Jordan at the time. Saddam’s decision to
use the legacy of the essentially decent king for his own reasons is
viewed as an obscenity by key Iraqi intellectuals.22
The cultivation of Iraqi nationalism was especially important
during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Throughout this conflict, the
Iranian government under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini attempted
to convince Shi’ite Iraqis to join with the Iranians in opposing
Saddam.23 In doing this, the Iranians attempted to play on their
sense of grievance against the Sunni government in Baghdad which
they characterized as “atheist” and even “a puppet of Satan.”24 Since
Iran is over 90 percent Shi’ite Muslim, questions of Arabism and
Iraqi nationalism verses Shi’ite solidarity became matters of regime
survival.
Although Iraq initiated the war with Iran, Iraqi forces performed
badly at the conflict’s beginning. Iraq’s military effectiveness on
Iranian soil was marginal, and the Iraqis were eventually driven out
of Iran. When the Iranians shifted to the offensive and attempted
to invade Iraqi territory, the situation changed, and the Iraqi army
began to improve dramatically. Eventually, Iraqi forces defeated the
Iranians and drove them from Iraqi soil. Shi’ite conscripts did the
brunt of this fighting which ended in 1988.25 In doing so, they had
at some level proven their loyalty to Iraq, although they might also
have seen themselves as fighting for Arabism and perhaps to defend
their own homes and communities. Events 3 years later suggested
that, whatever they were fighting for, it was not Saddam Hussein.
Shi’ites in southern Iraq rose against Saddam in 1991 in the
aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. They did so in the
expectation of U.S. support which never came. The uprising
prompted incredibly brutal retaliation by the regime in which
Republican Guard units painted “La Shi’ite Ba’d al Yom” (No more
Shi’ites after today) on their tanks as they destroyed Shi’ite centers
of resistance. Total casualties are difficult to establish but are usually

8

described as between 30,000 to 60,000 people.26 These figures may
be revised upward as more mass graves of Saddam’s political
opponents are uncovered.27
Unlike an unsuccessful 1991 Kurdish uprising, there is no
indication that the Shi’ites rose up as a separatist movement. Rather,
they saw an opportunity to rid themselves of Saddam Hussein
and the Baath party within the context of a U.S. call to rise against
the tyranny. This behavior indicated that Shi’ite Arabs consider
themselves Iraqis, albeit Iraqis with grievances against both Saddam
and the earlier governments of Iraq which excluded them from an
equitable share of political power.
The U.S.-Iraqi War of 2003.
In March 2003 a U.S.-led coalition initiated military operations
against Iraq with the purpose of eliminating the Saddam Hussein
regime and disarming Iraq of all weapons of mass destruction. The
major battles of the war were over within a month, and President
Bush declared the major combat stage of the war over within 6
weeks of initiating the conflict. Saddam Hussein, whose concern
with his own survival is legendary, apparently implemented one of
many potential escape plans and has yet to surface at the time of this
writing. It is also possible that Saddam is dead, although there is no
evidence that he was killed or even effectively targeted during the
war.
Iraqi pre-war and wartime propaganda sought to feed into
nationalistic sentiment in an effort to motivate Iraqis to resist. The
population was told that the United States was planning to intervene
to safeguard Israel and plunder Iraqi energy resources.28 This
explanation may have seemed more plausible to the Iraqi population
than the U.S. explanation that it is waging a war for Middle East
democracy and because it feared Saddam’s unconventional
weapons. Most Iraqis probably did not believe that such weapons
represented a serious threat to the United States, if they believed that
Iraq possessed such weapons at all. Iraqi propaganda maintained
that they did not.
On the other side of this equation was the strong U.S. assertion
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that it sought only to remove the regime and not to rule the country.
It was hardly a secret that the United States and Iraq had maintained
bitterly poisoned relations under Saddam Hussein, and that the
United States viewed him as the leader of a criminal regime. U.S.
declarations about “regime change” seemed set to undermine a key
reason for an assertive Iraqi defense against a U.S. invasion. If the
United States only sought to rid the country of Saddam and not to
rule Iraq, it was not clear how nationalism would come into play.
One early surprise in the war was the willingness of some Iraqi
military and paramilitary forces to oppose U.S. forces in a spirited
manner in the southern part of the country. This unexpected
resistance caused a brief spike in U.S. concern over the ability of Iraqi
forces to harass U.S. supply lines and hold out in urban fighting in
some of the Shi’ite cities of the south. Some Iraqi conventional units
also surrendered to coalition forces in 2003 but nothing on the scale
of 1991 when 70,000-80,000 troops capitulated almost instantly.29
Some U.S. observers now began to fear that Iraqi nationalism had
been underestimated.
Another cause for U.S. concern materialized early in the war
when the Arab and Western media began reporting stories about
expatriate Iraqis returning to their country to fight against coalition
forces. Iraqis interviewed by the media included anti-Saddam exiles
who were willing to put aside their differences with the dictator in
order to resist a foreign invasion. Many of these people were part of
the Iraqi exile community in Jordan and returned to their homeland
in buses.30 Jordanians who wished to fight were not allowed to exit
directly into Iraq, although some would get there by transiting
through a third country or by leaving Jordan illegally. Thus, the
passengers in these particular buses did seem to be Iraqi and not
other Arabs.
Nevertheless, the idea that Iraq was being defended by a
committed and nationalist military started to fray within a few
weeks of the fighting, and some of the message about the United
States seeking only to oust Saddam may have been getting through
to the Iraqis. Moreover, some early indications of Iraqi commitment
now appeared exaggerated. The drama of the returning expatriate
Iraqis was soon overshadowed by modest numbers of returnees.
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In total, press reports indicated that only about 4,000 Iraqis left for
their homeland in the first 10 days of the war out of approximately
400,000 Iraqis in Jordan. Additionally, in Jordan, as elsewhere in the
Arab World, extreme reports of U.S. brutality filled the airwaves. The
population was deluged by graphic images of war dead, and was
perhaps especially susceptible to calls to return home. Furthermore,
initial Arab reports suggested that the Iraqis were holding their own
against coalition forces, allowing some Iraqi exiles to see this as a
moment of glory where they could play a part.
During the fighting in southern Iraq, it also became increasingly
clear that only a narrow base of society was assertively resisting the
invasion. Much of the Iraqi resistance that occurred was conducted
by the Fedayeen Saddam and the Baath Party militias or other
individuals coerced by these groups. This membership complicates
any effort to make wider generalizations about Iraqi nationalism
since such organizations were among the most likely places to find
fanatical regime supporters. Even among these paramilitaries, some
members may have been coerced into fighting by threats to their
lives and families. Furthermore, the Iraqis who fought most fiercely
for the regime are widely believed to have been Arab Sunni, young,
poorly educated, and especially susceptible to regime propaganda.31
Some of these fighters may also have believed that the fall of the
Saddam regime would have extremely grave personal consequences
for them.
As the war progressed, the unexpectedly high level of resistance
in Najaf and Basra led U.S. commanders to worry about the
possibility of intensive fighting in Baghdad with its population of
5 million people. Initially, these concerns appeared justified. U.S.
Army and Marine Corps maneuver combat units entering Baghdad
encountered intense but ineffective resistance from Iraqi forces
using poor tactics and mostly ineffective light weapons. Suicide car
bombers also repeatedly attempted to drive their explosives-laden
vehicles into U.S. tactical vehicles, including tanks.32 Nevertheless,
such tactics were ineffective against heavy U.S. ground forces.
Sometime after the U.S. ground force raids into Baghdad, Iraqi
morale seemed to break. Vastly disproportionate casualties were
certainly a factor. Moreover, the discrepancy in weapons and training
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between U.S. and Iraqi forces had become extremely apparent by
this time. Additionally, the devastation of large conventional units
from the air and the inability of lightly-armed guerrillas to inflict
serious damage on U.S. armored and mechanized forces helped to
undermine any hope of victory.
Iraqi nationalism as exemplified by will-to-fight was questioned.
Fighting now appeared both suicidal and doomed to failure.
Moreover, fighting against a foreign invader, in addition to appearing
futile, was perhaps increasingly linked to fighting for Saddam.33 By
early April, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shi’ite
cleric, had issued a fatwa (religious declaration), calling upon his
followers not to resist the invasion. It is thus possible that Iraqi
nationalism became increasingly delinked to fighting for the regime
as the war continued. The call for neutrality by Iraq’s leading Shi’ite
cleric would also have undermined the Shi’ite will to fight among
those who felt they were fighting for their clan or community as
much as they were fighting for Iraq.
The role of foreign fighters was another factor that cast doubt
on the psychological link between Iraqi nationalism and the defense
of Saddam’s regime. Nationalism, as indicated by resistance to a
foreign invader, was hardly relevant to a situation where sacrifices
were made by individuals from other Arab nations who rallied to
the Iraqi cause out of religious zeal, anti-Americanism, or Arab
solidarity. Thus questions arise as to how many of these fighters
there were and to what extent they contributed to Iraq’s defense.
According to Saddam Hussein’s government, around 5,000
foreign Arab volunteers joined with the Iraqis to fight against the
U.S invasion.34 This number may have been inflated for propaganda
purposes in an effort to present Iraqi defense as a sacred pan-Arab
cause in the same way many Arabs look at the issue of Palestinian
rights. Nevertheless, many independent sources suggest that there
were a large number of foreign fighters. Most sources indicate
that these fighters (with the exception of some of the Palestinians)
had little to no military training. Many apparently fought bravely
but without much professionalism or discipline, leading to large
numbers of casualties. Some of them later said that they were
betrayed by Saddam and the Iraqis who made an insufficient effort
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to defend the regime themselves.35
The Iraqi response to the invasion thus does not seem to have
emerged as a strong test of Iraqi nationalism. Many Iraqis appeared
willing to tolerate the U.S. invasion if it rid them of Saddam. The
coalition victory over the regime, nevertheless, left the United
States as an occupying power on probation with the Iraqi masses.
The lack of enthusiasm for Saddam’s regime clearly led to a halfhearted defense at best, but Iraqi emotions about the continuing
U.S. military presence could become quite intense should the Iraqis
become offended through either U.S. conduct or the duration of the
U.S. presence. Iraqi response to the U.S. troop presence or a U.S.
attempt to install a pro-American government could, therefore,
become a more serious flashpoint for an anti-American form of Iraqi
nationalism to emerge.
Iraqi Nationalism and Anti-Americanism.
The U.S.-Iraqi postwar relationship got off to a rocky start when
U.S. forces failed to control massive outbreaks of looting throughout
the country. Of particular importance were the looting of the
Baghdad Antiquities Museum, the Mosul Museum of Antiquities,
and the Baghdad library and religious endowments housing ancient
Islamic manuscripts. While these disasters occurred as a result of
unforeseen problems, many Iraqis immediately saw this action as
a U.S. government conspiracy. The museum and other sites were
viewed as repositories of Iraqi history and heritage dating back to
the pre-Arab empires of Babylon, Samaria, and Assyria. To allow
their destruction and looting was seen as a blow against the Iraqi
sense of national pride and identity: a humiliation necessary to begin
the process of remolding Iraqis in a Western image.36 Additionally,
many Iraqis are furious that the United States was able to protect the
Oil Ministry but not cultural sites. Later, it became apparent that the
Baghdad Museum was not looted as badly as first ascertained.37
Another Iraqi conspiracy theory that emerged early in the
postwar era was that rampant looting was being allowed to occur
with tacit U.S. support so that U.S. companies would have more and
better reconstruction contracts.38 It is not known how widely this
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theory is believed. Also of interest was the tendency among Shi’ites,
and especially clerics, to blame U.S. forces for the disappearance of
Baghdad’s leading Shi’ite cleric, Mohammed al Fartousi. He was
both radical and anti-American, but also had a variety of enemies,
and the reflexive decision to blame U.S. forces was disturbing.39
Perhaps the most malignant conspiracy theory circulating
widely in Iraq is that Saddam and the U.S. leadership made a
secret deal in which he would leave the country with his riches in
exchange for arranging only a minimal defense of the country from
invasion. Some versions of this delusion even have Saddam living
in secret exile under U.S. protection, making a mockery of U.S. calls
for justice.40 Unfortunately, it is virtually inevitable that many new
and potentially popular conspiracy theories will be generated as the
result of a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq, no matter how ridiculous
these tales seem to Western observers.
This ongoing Iraqi willingness to accept many unusual and
bizarre conspiracy theories is an important characteristic of Arab
culture. Reasons for this phenomenon, which also exists in Iran,
are the subject of considerable speculation. Generally, the citizens
of weak states at the mercy of stronger states are believed to be
particularly vulnerable to conspiracy theories. Additionally, citizens
of countries without a free press often embrace conspiracy theories,
since they are accustomed to false information from official sources
and look to the street as an alternate source of news. No country has
maintained a more controlled press than Iraq. Moreover, the Baath
government has used the constant charge of foreign conspiracies and
foreign espionage as one of the justifications for the maintenance of a
police state.41 Such an approach pre-dates the U.S.-Iraqi confrontation
of 1990 and often focused on Israel’s real, alleged, and fabricated
activities. By now, thinking in conspiracy theories may have become
an Iraqi habit.
Iraqis may also blame the United States as well as Saddam, or
instead of Saddam, for the economic sanctions that have impoverished
them in the years following the 1991 Gulf War. Certainly, most of the
Arab World has blamed the United States for these sanctions. As
the situation in Iraq stabilizes, it is possible that Iraqis will be more
critical of their own government’s role in provoking the sanctions, but
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this is not clear. One of the most pervasive and enduring conspiracy
theories popular throughout the Arab World suggests that Saddam
was lured into invading Kuwait in 1990 by a United States anxious
for an excuse to attack him and shatter his military power before it
grew unmanageable. This theory may have appeal for the Iraqis as it
permeates the larger Arab World.
Additionally, many Iraqis may have agreed with Saddam’s
decision to invade Kuwait which provoked the first war with the
United States and the postwar sanctions. They see these punishments
as unreasonable. Two earlier Iraqi leaders (King Ghazi and Brigadier
Qassim) also spoke about the need to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq,
and Qassim produced a credible threat to invade Kuwait in 1961.42
The idea of a powerful Iraq, strengthened by Kuwaiti oil and
possessing the Kuwaiti coastline, appears to have great appeal to
many Iraqis as well as other Arabs. Moreover, many Iraqis came to
dislike the Kuwaitis in the course of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War when
they often viewed them as ungrateful for Iraqi protection against
Iran and arrogant because of their wealth.
Prior to the 2003 war, the Iraqi government made the argument
that the United States was planning an attack in order to dominate
the Iraqi economy and protect Israel from Iraqi attack. It is
uncertain to what extent this propaganda has been either accepted
or dismissed by the Iraqi population, but there may be a certain
wariness on both issues. Some individuals involved with U.S. Iraq
policy have been described by the Arab press as excessively close to
Israel.43 Additionally, many Iraqis may have internalized years of
propaganda on this issue and believe the intervention was a way of
reducing the dangers to Israel of a large, populous, and oil rich Arab
state that was wriggling free of crippling sanctions.
The postwar U.S. presence in Iraq also comes at a time when the
United States is viewed across the Arab World as being especially
supportive of Israeli leader Ariel Sharon and his assertive efforts
to control Palestinian terrorism and resistance in the Palestinian
territories. Previously Saddam made a strong effort to suggest
that the Palestinian and Iraqi causes are the same. It is not known
the extent to which this case has impressed Iraqis, but anti-Israeli
attitudes pre-dated the Baath rise to power in 1968. Iraq participated
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in both the 1948-49 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars under non-Baath
governments. It also participated in the 1973 War as a result of the
efforts of Saddam Hussein.44
Some Iraqis also appear concerned that the U.S. military presence
in their country will continue in some form for the indefinite future.
The argument that Westerners can manage an Arab state better than
the native inhabitants is an old colonialist one, and can be taken as
such now no matter how true or how well-intentioned statements
made by U.S. leaders are.45 The UK may also be distrusted in Iraq
due to the colonial legacy. The analogy of the Palestinians keeps
surfacing among Iraqis seeking to underscore their worries about a
long-term U.S. occupation.
The presence of foreign bases in Iraq previously has been a
particularly sensitive matter and the prospects of new basing
agreements can be expected to cause resentment among Iraqi
nationalists. In the 1950s until the 1980s, Western bases in the Middle
East were often described as being placed there to defend the region
against Soviet aggression such as occurred with the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. Despite this impressive external threat, many
Arabs assumed that the primary function of such military outposts
was to dominate the Middle East and suppress indigenous threats to
Western interests. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union removed an important justification for a Western
presence in the area. The defeat of Saddam Hussein, a proven
aggressor against Kuwait, removes a further justification. Iraqis
correspondingly will be a difficult audience to convince that longterm postwar U.S. bases in Iraq will be necessary, especially since the
majority of the Arab World will inevitably oppose such an option.
Conservative Muslims have additional reasons for opposing a
continued Western presence in Iraq. Many believe that the West is the
source of cultural pollution that can undermine the fabric of a moral
society. In other contexts this has been called “cultural imperialism”
or “West-toxification.” In particular, some Muslims worry about
what they view as Western permissiveness, the use of alcohol,
the widespread availability of narcotics, atheism, pornography,
nightclubs, youth rebellion, sexual promiscuity, and other perceived
Western vices. The longer the United States stays in Iraq, the more
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likely these vices are to take hold according to this type of thinking.
Another persistent Iraqi rumor is that the U.S. troops have brought
AIDS to their country, and that an epidemic is likely.46
The Emerging Role of the Shi’ites in Defining Postwar Iraq.
As the future of post-Saddam Iraq unfolds, the position of the
Shi’ite Arabs is emerging as a critical factor. Shi’ites represent 60-65
percent of the total Iraqi population and around 80 percent of Iraq’s
Arab population. (Most Iraqi Kurds are Sunni and therefore alter
the ratio for the Sunnis, although these Kurds feel little solidarity
with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs). Thus over 15 million people of Iraq’s total
population of 24 million are Shi’ites. The Shi’ites of Iraq are a diverse
group, comprising both secular and religious elements. They are
numerically dominant in the southern part of the country, and the
cities of Karbala and Najaf are important centers of Shi’ite religious
learning.47 In addition to the Shi’ites of the south, at least two million
Shi’ites also live in Sadr City (formerly Saddam City and before
that Revolution [Thawra] City), a large slum in the eastern part of
Baghdad. Other Shi’ites live in more prosperous areas of Baghdad
and have thus altered the demographic balance of this traditional
seat of Sunni dominance.
Despite decades of discrimination, Iraq’s Shi’ite Arabs, as noted,
have shown little interest in secessionism in recent years. Rather,
most Shi’ites have viewed themselves as Iraqis with grievances
to be addressed through either political reform or revolution. The
destruction of Saddam’s regime is widely viewed as offering them
the opportunity to emerge as dominant in Iraqi politics.
Shi’ites are often particularly difficult for Westerners to
understand. They are Muslims with the same faith in the Koran and
the same obligations to follow the “pillars” (fundamental obligations)
of Islam as the Sunnis. Nevertheless, and despite the claims of many
of the Shi’ites themselves, important differences exist. Shi’ites look
to the life and example of the fourth Caliph, Ali and his family, as a
source of inspiration, especially for dealing with pain and suffering.
Ali was murdered with a poisoned dagger and his son, Hussein ibn
Ali, killed in a hopelessly unequal battle on the plains of Karbala
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after refusing to pay tribute to a powerful enemy in Damascus who
had claimed the leadership of the Muslim community.
The Shi’ite focus on martyrdom is often described as the “Karbala
complex,” referring to the death of Hussein ibn Ali. This complex
remains striking in a contemporary context, and one scholar of
Shi’ism refers to Karbala as the core of Shi’ite history.48 Zealots among
the Iraqi Shi’ites sometimes engage in self-flagellation during the
Ashura ceremony in order to feel closer to the suffering of Hussein
ibn Ali. The Shi’ite passion about martyrdom is also sometimes
believed to make their zealots especially willing to engage in suicide
operations. This clearly was the case in Lebanon beginning in the
1980s. While Sunni Palestinian terrorists and other non-Shi’ites have
also engaged in suicide bombings, they have adapted these tactics to
their situation largely because of the example set by Shi’ite groups
such as the Lebanese Hizballah.49
Shi’ite religious leadership is also quite different from that found
in Sunni Islam. The Shi’ite hierarchy is organized in a complex
pyramid structure unheard of in Sunni Islam. Consequently, the
guidance offered by senior clerics is extremely important. According
to Shi’ite doctrine, believers are bound by the fatwas (or religious
declarations) of the clerics they choose to follow so long as those
clerics are alive. The hierarchy of the Shi’ite clergy is complex, but it is
worth noting for the purpose of understanding the current religious
establishment in Iraq. Accordingly, six grades are open to those
trained at Mosque schools. The initial grade is talib ilm, a student.
Upon graduation, one becomes a mujtahid, which is translated as
one who has exerted himself to be able to frame an opinion. The
third grade is mubellegh al risala, or carrier of the message; the fourth
is hojat al Islam, or authority on Islam. The fifth is that of ayatollah, or
sign of God. The sixth grade is grand ayatollah, or great sign of God.50
Promotions to the highest grades are usually based on factors such
as the authorship of important Islamic tracts and the establishment
of a following of promising students. Promotions traditionally have
been decided upon by the religious establishment, but in Saddam’s
Iraq, the last few appointments to grand ayatollah were made by the
government, which was nevertheless forced to choose among the
most highly qualified candidates (of which there were very few).51
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The Shi’ites are also known to have a history of involvement with
the doctrine of tuq’a or dissimulation.52 This doctrine suggests that, in
the face of an oppressor and especially an occupation force, one must
deceive the enemy with lies and falsehoods to survive. In some cases,
it is even permissible to hide one’s religion or religious practices.53
While a variety of occupied peoples may lie to their occupiers, tuq’a
makes collaboration acceptable so long as it is a direct response to
coercion and does not last longer than the coercion itself. Implicit in
tuq’a is the right to turn against the occupier as soon as it is possible
to do so. Friends become enemies in the blink of an eye. In the past,
tuq’a has been more clearly linked to Iranian Shi’ites than Iraqis, and
the first leader of revolutionary Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
denounced it as cowardly early in his career. It is uncertain what
currency it holds in contemporary Iraq.
Leadership in the Shi’ite community was severely regulated and
stunted during Saddam Hussein’s years in power. Saddam carefully
watched the Shi’ites, taking great care to eliminate or co-opt any
figures that appeared to have a potential to challenge the regime.
The 1979 experience of neighboring Iran was perhaps especially
troubling to Saddam when the secular shah was overthrown by
militant Shi’ites who then established an Islamic government. When
war broke out between theocratic Iran and secular Iraq in 1980,
Iraqi clerics became even more suspect in the eyes of the regime.
Additionally, some Iraqi clerics were openly sympathetic to Iran,
leading to their imprisonment, torture, and assassination.54 This
persecution of the clerical establishment continued long after the
war with Iran had ended. Moreover, as noted, Saddam savagely
attacked the Shi’ites and killed many of their leaders in the aftermath
of the 1991 rebellion.
In 2003, the U.S. Administration was especially hopeful that
the Shi’ites of Iraq would rally to support the U.S. invasion due
to the oppression that they had suffered under Saddam’s regime.
Instead, the Shi’ites displayed caution. In early April, Iraq’s leading
Shi’ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani of Najaf, issued a fatwa
instructing fellow Shi’ites not to oppose the U.S.-led invasion.55
Sistani is the only Grand Ayatollah in Iraq and, as such, is the highest
ranking Shi’ite religious authority. While U.S. policymakers were
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pleased with Sistani’s declaration, it clearly fell short of their hopes
for a call to rebellion. The Shi’ites practiced neutrality in the fighting
rather than support of the invasion. In an interesting postscript to this
event, an angry mob encircled Sistani’s house shortly after the fall of
Baghdad and demanded that he leave the country.56 This action is
sometimes seen as anger over his defeatism, but is alternatively
explained as part of the rivalries within the Shi’ite community or
even anger at his previous unwillingness to confront Saddam. Such
a confrontation would of course have been fatal to Sistani.
Additionally, while the Shi’ite clergy were content to stand aside
and watch the United States oust Saddam, they have displayed
no interest in allowing the United States to shape future Iraqi
institutions. Rather, a variety of Shi’ite religious leaders have sought
to assume power themselves and limit the U.S. role in governance
as much as possible. Following the defeat of Saddam loyalists in the
south, Shi’ite clerics rapidly moved to establish themselves as the
center of local government for the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.57
Religious passions, long suppressed under the Baathists, almost
immediately reasserted themselves.
Shi’ite clerical efforts to dominate local government in the
southern cities of Kut, Najaf, and Karbala, along with surrounding
villages and towns, were carried out with remarkable speed and
effectiveness. They did this in many cases by assuming control
of essential services, including neighborhood security, garbage
collection, firefighting, education, and hospital administration.
They also appointed administrators and imposed curfews, while
offering civic protection, jobs, health care, and financial assistance
to the needy.58 Clerical ability to assume these tasks was a direct
result of organizational, communications, and fund-raising skills
honed through years of religious activity and charity work, as well
as limited efforts at dissent.59
In moving to take control of key aspects of local government,
the clerics had a major advantage of being one of the groups least
compromised by previous cooperative relations with Saddam.
Saddam, as a secular leader, did make an effort to include Shi’ite
technocrats in his leadership, but had little interest in working with
Shi’ite clerics, beyond bribing or cajoling them into supporting
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the regime. Conversely, a number of Shi’ite leaders were openly
murdered by the Baath regime or disappeared under suspicious
circumstances when they appeared too independent, or perhaps
too capable of establishing a mass following. A few were publicly
executed for openly supporting the Khomeini regime in Iran.60
Competition for power among clerics also rapidly materialized
as the postwar situation unfolded. Occasionally, the followers of
leading clerics sought to suggest that they were more anti-American
than their rivals, apparently viewing this as a key asset in appealing
to the Shi’ite masses.61 Anti-Americanism was sometimes apparent
at some of the Shi’ite rituals where politics and religion can easily
become intertwined. Some marchers to Karbala, for example, were
seen to be chanting or carrying signs calling for “Death to America.”62
The number of such signs was limited in the immediate postwar era
and some were even written in Farsi, in a less than subtle indication
of Iranian influence.63
The Najaf-based Hawza al Ilmiya (circle of scholars), which is
formally headed by Grand Ayatollah al Sistani, emerged as a key
voice of the Shi’ite clerical establishment in the postwar era. This
organization is led by senior and hence older clerics such as the
73-year-old Sistani. Almost immediately after the war, mosques
throughout the mostly Shi’ite south and the Shi’ite areas of Baghdad
declared their allegiance to the Hawza.64 However, it is not clear
if they were declaring their allegiance to Sistani and his senior
colleagues, clerical rule, or simply acknowledging their willingness
to receive guidance from the Shi’ite leadership in Najaf without
getting involved in the power struggles there.
Opposing Sistani for control of the religious establishment is the
Sadr movement (sometimes called the Sadr-2 movement), led by
Sayyid Muatada al Sadr, the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
Sadiq al Sadr. Grand Ayatollah al Sadr was murdered by Saddam’s
agents in February 1999 after his speeches became increasingly
popular and showed some independence from government
censorship.65 Several of his older sons were murdered as well in
the incident. The courage of Grand Ayatollah al Sadr, along with
his martyrdom and that of his sons, has conferred considerable
legitimacy on Muatada al Sadr, his surviving son. While Muatada
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is too young to be a senior cleric, he has managed to have himself
designated as the representative of Ayatollah Kazim al Husseini al
Haeri, an Iraqi exile in Qom, Iran. This appointment has allowed
Sadr to speak with considerable religious authority despite still
being in his 20s.66 Interestingly, Ayatollah al Haeri is one of the few
Iraqi scholars to accept the Iranian concept of clerical rule.67
Al Sadr is widely viewed as both more ruthless and more antiAmerican than most Shi’ite clergy, and he sometimes maintains that
the United States liberated Iraq only as a helpless tool of God.68 Iraqis
correspondingly owe the United States nothing. He is also believed
to have been involved in the murder of Shi’ite cleric Abdul Majid al
Khoei,69 who had lived in exile in London and was widely described
as “America’s favorite cleric.” Khoei nevertheless was probably
murdered as part of a power struggle with Sadr and others and not
for ideological reasons. Sadr, like his Iranian-based mentor Haeri,
favors cleric rule.
Another organization that seeks to dominate the Iraqi religious
establishment is the Iranian funded and supported Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI is led by Ayatollah
Mohammad Bakir al Hakim, who has lived in exile in Iran for over
20 years. Many members of Hakim’s family were killed by Saddam,
and Hakim’s record of opposition to the Baathists is sterling. SCIRI,
according to some sources, is at least loosely affiliated with the
reform movement in Iran rather than the hardliners, although it is
difficult to predict how this linkage will influence their operations
within Iraq.70 Nevertheless, al Hakim did collaborate with the enemy
during the Iran-Iraq War, and it is unclear if this can be forgiven
due to his hostility to Saddam. It is also uncertain if Tehran will
continue to dominate SCIRI now that al Hakim is seeking a power
base outside Iran.
The military arm of SCIRI is the Badr Corps which has been
infiltrating back into the Iraq since the war broke out. This group
is comprised of 5,000-10,000 militiamen trained by Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Several thousand Badr Corps
members are believed to be in Iraq now, giving Hakim an important
advantage in providing trained militia for the preservation of
security in Iraqi cities, towns, and villages. Other members have
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been prevented from crossing the border by U.S. troops.71
One especially worrisome organization is the al Dawa Islamiyah
(the Islamic Call) group. Al Dawa was founded in 1957 and has a
long history as a terrorist organization, waging war against both
Saddam Hussein’s government and also occasionally Americans
and U.S. supporters within the Arab World. In recent years, it
has, however, focused more exclusively on fighting the Saddam
regime. Currently, al Dawa claims to have several thousand fighters
under arms, although the organization is also reported to be deeply
fragmented. They also claim responsibility for a December 12,
1996, attack on Saddam Hussein’s oldest son, Uday, in which he
was severely wounded and two of his companions were killed.72
This claim remains unproven, but is not unlikely given al Dawa’s
extensive use of assassination tactics.
While the Shi’ites of Iraq are a diverse group, it is a mistake to
assume that they are too diverse to be brought under the control of
clerical leaders in the near future. The clerics, as noted, are clearly
the most organized indigenous source of leadership in Iraq and, as
noted, many have been expanding their civil authority since early in
the war, building on earlier communications and charity networks.
An especially interesting question is whether a single leader will
emerge to dominate the Shi’ite Iraqi clergy. If such a person does
emerge and is highly politicized, he could be in a position to
dominate Iraqi politics.
Many ordinary Shi’ites often tend to place more trust in their
religious leaders rather than the secular elites for both religious
reasons and because of the reluctance of many clerics to collaborate
with Saddam beyond the limits required to survive. The example
of the Iranian revolution also suggests that the mosque is one of the
few places that citizens can go to feel some distance from a dictatorial
government (in this case the government of Iran’s last shah).73 If this
kind of citizen-mosque connection exists to the same extent in Iraq,
it could further strengthen the clerics in any struggle with secular
elites.
Some Shi’ite clerics have also begun stating that it is unacceptable
to take humanitarian aid from any source except the mosque.74 Ideally,
from their point of view, they should become the intermediary for
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all aid going to the population, thus establishing an ironclad grip on
power. Such an approach, while intolerable from a U.S. standpoint,
may appear more reasonable to the Iraqi population because of the
activities of Christian missionaries in that country, some of whom
are believed to seek to convert Muslims to Christianity.75 These
organizations have been in Iraq since the end of the war, giving
out food and medicine.76 In Islam apostasy is an unpardonable sin
punishable by death. While it is extremely doubtful that converted
Muslims would be executed, they nevertheless would become
pariahs within their own society.
It is also possible that the radical Shi’ite clergy would seek
power by constitutional means and then dismantle the democratic
process to set themselves up in power permanently. This type of
approach has been dramatically referred to as “one person, one
vote, one time.”77 Currently, the press is reporting that many Iraqi
clerics oppose clerical rule, but these statements need to be placed
in context. The Iranian concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of
the Jurist) has been denounced by the Iraqi religious establishment
during Saddam’s reign because failure to do so would have placed
them in danger of severe regime punishment, including execution.
Clerical rule may gain a new appeal in the post-Saddam era,
although the Iranian model is also filled with failures and problems
that could cause Iraqi religious leaders to reconsider any effort to
seize formal power.
The Sunnis and the Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq.
Shi’ite power appears to be on the rise in Iraq, increasing the
possibility of a new Iraqi nationalism with a Shi’ite face. Sunni Arabs
and Kurds correspondingly are watching these developments with
great interest. Thus far, most Sunnis seem to be adopting a waitand-see attitude. Despite possible changes in the distribution of
power, Iraqi Sunnis have little choice but to accept social change and
perhaps search out new ways to dominate the emerging political
entity. Additionally, Sunni groups are establishing neighborhood
militias as rapidly as possible as a hedge against future problems.78
They can also be expected to pay considerable attention to the
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sectarian composition of emerging national military and police
institutions since these are the traditional instruments of Sunni Arab
domination.79
Sunni Arabs have special reasons to view the U.S. presence in Iraq
with suspicion. The foremost partisans of the old regime were Sunni,
and many Sunnis may feel that they have the most to lose in a process
of de-Baathification. Thus, some Sunnis may believe that the longer
the United States remains in Iraq, the more danger that they will be
pushed farther from the levers of power by a comprehensive deBaathification program. The loss of power is especially frightening to
those Sunnis who believe that their entire community at some point
may be held responsible for Saddam’s crimes and those of his Sunni
predecessors. Naturally, any U.S. slackening on de-Baathification to
appease Sunni Muslims threatens to alienate victims of the Baath
and particularly Shi’ite Arabs and Kurds.80
The majority Sunni view about the creation of an Islamic republic
is as yet uncertain. Sunni Arabs are usually considered the most
secularized Arabs of Iraq, although it is unclear if they will choose
to remain as such. Some Sunnis seem to view the possibility of an
Islamic republic positively, and Sunni religious parties have been
formed including the Iraqi Islamic Party. This party seems to be
relatively moderate at this time and claims to favor coexistence with
Christians and Jews and has also renounced violence.81 Moreover,
even the most devout Sunnis can be expected to oppose any efforts
by the Iranians to expand their influence in Iraq as such influence
would almost certainly be placed at the disposal of the Iraqi
Shi’ites.
Kurdish groups have had few good experiences at the hands
of central governments in Baghdad and numerous bad ones. Yet,
of all their bad experiences, their interaction with Saddam has
been especially traumatic. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War
in 1988, Saddam ordered the Republican Guard to move against
the Kurds to punish them for collaboration with the Iranians. The
resulting campaign, known as the Anfal, destroyed large tracts of
Kurdistan and provoked Human Rights groups to charge that acts of
genocide were taking place. Chemical weapons and possibly fuel air
explosives were used against Kurdish civilians in this campaign.82
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The aftermath of Saddam’s defeat may be the best chance that
the Kurds see for gaining de facto independence or a strong measure
of autonomy that includes control of extensive oil resources. It can
be expected that all major Kurdish groups will explore the potential
to separate informally from Baghdad, watching the responses from
Baghdad, Washington, Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus. They will
probably resist the temptation to declare formal independence
immediately since this would provoke unfriendly reactions from a
number of neighboring states, most notably Turkey.
Iraqi Kurds have long experience with Sunni Arab governments
that make concessions to them while those governments are weak
and then attempt to reclaim those concessions once they become
stronger. For that reason, the Kurds can be expected to do everything
that they can to institutionalize central government concessions. At a
minimum, they will seek a separate military capability, even if these
troops are part of a national Iraqi military on paper.
It might also be noted that Iraqi Kurds, protected by the United
States, have been governing themselves from an autonomous enclave
since 1991. Self-government has become increasingly important to
their needs since that time. Nevertheless, the Kurds currently occupy
only about half of the territory that both of their major parties claim
should be the total area of autonomous Kurdistan.83 Differences over
the future of this disputed territory could become especially serious
in the post-Saddam era. Some problems have already emerged as
Kurds attempt to reclaim homes taken from them as a result of
Saddam’s efforts to “Arabize” strategic and economically valuable
areas of northern Iraq.84 Coalition authorities are currently working
closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) on this issue, which could present an ongoing challenge
to U.S. goals in the region.85
Moreover, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have a mixed record of being
able to cooperate with each other. In 1996 they fought a brief war
while seeking support from outside powers.86 The PUK obtained
Iranian support, and the KDP then accepted aid from Saddam. The
propensity of these two groups to disagree and then to seek foreign
help does not bode well for the future of northern Iraq.
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Kurdish assertiveness can also be expected to produce an Arab
backlash. A variety of emerging Iraqi leaders may feel compelled
to emphasize Iraqi nationalism as a way of unifying the country as
it comes under more centrifugal pressures especially those from
secessionist Kurds. The result could be a renewal of guerrilla war
between the Baghdad center and the Kurdish areas as soon as the
international environment permits such events to occur.
Tribal Identity and Iraqi Nationalism.
The Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish populations of Iraq are further
subdivided by tribal affiliation with hundreds of tribes scattered
throughout the country. While previous Iraqi governments have
viewed tribes as suspicious alternative sources of authority, Saddam
viewed them as forming important fault lines upon which to
splinter and further fractionalize potential sources of opposition
within larger ethnic and religious communities.87 Additionally, as
noted, Sunni tribes have been key recruiting grounds for the officer
corps of the Iraqi military. Thus, Saddam ignored Baathist ideology
which proclaims tribes backward and an obstacle to modernization,
in order to use the tribal system as a bulwark of his own power.
Saddam has even called the Baath party “the tribe encompassing all
tribes.”88
Saddam’s retribalization of Iraq began in the 1980s and appears
to have some links to Arab nationalism. In the war with Iran,
Saddam was concerned about the prospects for betrayal by the
Shi’ite population of his country and therefore made strong efforts
to emphasize the Arab identity of Iraqis. Part of this effort seems
to have been a renewed emphasis on the importance of the tribal
identity as part of the wider Iraqi identity. In a deeply ambitious
ploy of totalitarian manipulation, Saddam hoped to strengthen
tribalism to support the Iraqi identity while also using it to fragment
political opponents.
The progress of retribalization over the last several decades is
also impressive. In that timeframe, townsmen, several generations
removed from the countryside started to “rediscover” their tribal
identities and affiliations. Some of these same people have sought
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out a tribal sheikh to ask permission to affiliate with his tribe in
cases where their own lineage has become unclear. This is done to
seek the protection and support of the tribe and improve chances for
individual advancement.89
Tribalism also seems to have strengthened in the Kurdish areas
during Saddam’s presidency as a result of central government
policies. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish conscripts were
exceptionally prone to desertion at the earliest opportunity, leading
Baghdad to switch to a tribal strategy to manage the Kurds and
address the manpower drain. In a move away from the conscription
of individual Kurds, the Iraqi government paid the leaders of
Kurdish tribal militias to perform various security duties useful to
the war effort. Tribalism was strengthened accordingly.
U.S. forces in Iraq are thus faced with the requirement to operate
within a highly tribalized society. This situation can create a number
of problems. Recently, tribal feuds have been reported as becoming
more evident, and, in at least one case, the identification of regime
collaborators was complicated by denunciations based on tribal
disputes.90 Additionally, tribalism may strengthen anti-Americanism
by reinforcing a chauvinistic form of Iraqi nationalism, while
simultaneously making Iraq more difficult to govern due to tribal
fragmentation. Also, where possible, tribal leaders may attempt
to lure the United States into supporting them in their various
disputes. On the positive side, tribal leaders may be useful contacts
with whom to deal. Some important tribal leaders, especially in the
Kurdish areas, have already indicated a strong interest in establishing
good relations with U.S. authorities, whom they view as a source of
patronage.91 They might also serve as something of a counterweight
to radical members of the clergy.
Iraqi Nationalism and Iranian Involvement in Postwar Iraq.
The Iranians watched the 2003 war with tremendous apprehension, but also with a strong interest in the opportunities that might
be available to influence the post-Saddam era. In the aftermath of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Iran has found itself increasingly encircled
by U.S. allies or potential client states. A friendly government in
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Iraq would help Tehran break out of its encirclement and extend its
influence throughout the region. An unfriendly government would
leave Iran vulnerable to increasing U.S. pressure.
The Iranians are also aware that an Islamic government in Iraq
may be organized along different lines than their own system and
correspondingly might be viewed as an alternative model for pious
Muslims. Another concern for Tehran is that dissident Iranian clerics
may seek exile in Najaf just as Ayatollah Khomeini did in his conflict
with Iran’s last shah. The existence of a powerful foreign center of
Shi’ite learning willing to shelter Iranian dissidents must be among
Tehran’s worst nightmares.
An Iraqi government that was both Islamic and democratic
would be of particular concern to Tehran. Thus Iran can reasonably
be assumed to have an interest in a government that is both friendly
to Tehran and supportive of the Iranian principle of clerical rule. It is
also possible that the Iranians would find an Iraqi civil war followed
by the disintegration of the Iraqi state as an acceptable alternative,
although they would never publicly admit to such a hope. A rump
Shi’ite state in southern Iraq would be easier for Tehran to dominate,
especially if it were under pressure from the Iraqi center. Moreover,
in this case, an Iraqi invasion of Iran such as occurred in 1980 would
no longer be possible since the state would have been dismembered
and its sources of strength dissipated among competing factions and
breakaway states. The chief drawback of this scenario for Iran would
be the potential for huge numbers of Iraqi refugees to flee across the
Iranian border.
Iran is using a variety of tactics to gain influence in Iraq including
the media. Arabic language broadcasts of Iranian television can be
received with an ordinary antenna in Baghdad, and the Iranians
have taken considerable advantage of their access. In the immediate
aftermath of the war this became the primary television news source
for Iraqis as their own government’s broadcasts had been knocked
off the air as a result of bombing. Iranian television is virulently
anti-American and repeats all of the worst charges against the
U.S. presence in Iraq.92 Al Alam television, a 24-hour news channel
operated by Iran’s state television and radio network, is a particularly
convenient source of news and Iranian propaganda.93 The Iranians
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also attempt to reach Iraqi citizens using radio broadcasts. The
United States has countered this effort through increased activity by
the Voice of America in Iraq and the reestablishment of Iraqi state
television. The use of Iraqi state television to reach Iraqi citizens
was delayed in the immediate aftermath of the war as result of the
looting of massive amounts of equipment.94
One of the most important ways Iran hopes to influence the
future of Iraq is through SCIRI and its armed wing the Badr Corps.
Agents of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are
widely believed to be accompanying Badr Corps fighters infiltrating
into Iraq from Iran.95 These actions place an extremely strong Iranian
subversive element in Iraq for the clear purpose of advancing Iranian
interests.
A key question therefore becomes whether Iraqi nationalism
will permit pro-Iranian leaders to assume and retain a position
of leadership in post-Saddam Iraq. Additionally, is it likely that
nationalist Shi’ite Iraqis will support Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders if
they believe these leaders will be able to deliver a new Iraq in which
Shi’ites dominate the political system?
While the answers to the above questions are uncertain, there are
reasons why collaboration with the Iranians may lack the salience that
it held during the Iran-Iraq War. Most importantly, with U.S. forces
now in Iraq, many Iraqi Shi’ites may assume that the United States is
a more serious threat than Iran in any competition to dominate their
country. Additionally, the internal Iraqi power sharing arrangement
has yet to be worked out among Iraqi Sunnis, Kurds, and Shi’ites.
Many Shi’ites may view Iranian backing as a powerful hedge against
Sunni efforts to deprive them of majority rule or Kurdish efforts to
achieve de facto independence from the country. Additionally, some
clerics are perhaps willing to play off the United States and Iran
without committing themselves to support either side.
Finally, the most important reason for Iraqis to consider
accepting an Iranian presence may be that various Iraqi clerics
remain in conflict with secular elites and each other for leadership
of their community. Aid from Iran may be useful to some leaders
in pursuing this competition. They may therefore put aside any
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feelings of resentment toward Iran as they focus on outmaneuvering
their rivals. Alternatively, those not favored with Iranian largess
could choose to criticize rivals for receiving it.
The Powder Keg: Hostile Incidents between U.S. Forces
and the Iraqi Population.
Foreign invasions can often feed and nourish national emotions
and extremism. A prolonged postwar U.S. military presence can
also nourish the same feelings. Additionally, the more disruptive
an occupation is to daily life, the more likely it will be to generate
resentment. Yet, an occupation that does not produce personal
security for the population will also engender feelings of anger
as has already been seen in Iraq. U.S. troops in the field are thus
given the choice of a light footprint that limits direct friction with
the population or a heavier footprint that provides more security.
Whatever they are assigned to do, their actions will be criticized
by multiple voices both inside and outside Iraq. There is no option
which will fail to produce substantial criticism.
The occupation will feel heavy-handed to Iraqis if their basic
religious institutions are challenged and if low level fighting
between civilian Iraqi guerrillas and U.S. forces begins to develop
and escalate. The longer the United States stays in Iraq, the more
potential will exist for the radical expansion of confrontations
between U.S. forces and increasingly hostile Shi’ites. Yet an early
departure risks the country collapsing in anarchy and civil war.
Meeting the goal of a stable government will require a continuing
presence in Iraq that could well become increasingly unwelcome
over time. Indeed, after the first year of a U.S. presence, Iraqis could
become particularly impatient.
Some attacks against U.S. forces have occurred following the war,
but most of this violence appears to have been conducted by residual
Saddam loyalists or anti-American individuals acting as individuals
or small groups rather than as part of a larger campaign. To date,
the most problematic of these incidents have occurred at Fallujah, a
Sunni city of 200,000, 35 miles west of Baghdad, known for its strong
Baathist presence.96 The Shi’ites, in contrast, are still holding back,
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although some state that military operations against U.S. forces may
become necessary if the United States seeks to act in an imperial
manner. Fatih Kashif al Ghita, a Hawza representative, summarized
the situation by stating, “I hope that the occupation troops will
not compel Iraqis who welcomed them to resort to violence. The
Americans can avoid such an eventuality if they demonstrate an
understanding of the political, social, economic, and even religious
realities in Iraq.”97
It should also be noted that there have been some serious
incidents with the Shi’ites that could have escalated but fortunately
did not. In An Numaniyah, U.S. Marines briefly arrested Shi’ite cleric
Said Habib at his house and were almost immediately surrounded
by a hostile crowd just beyond Habib’s courtyard. As the crowd
grew and some among them appeared to be armed, the Marines
aimed their weapons at the Iraqis. At this point, the potential for a
tragic incident seemed high, but tensions quickly defused when a
Marine intelligence team, and its Iraqi-American civilian translator
arrived and convinced the Marines to remove tape from the cleric’s
wrists and mouth. It was then established that Sheikh Habib has
been falsely accused by a tainted source. Later, when the cleric and
his supporters were released, he accepted the explanation that the
entire episode had been a mistake, and helped to calm the crowd.98
At the point where weapons were trained on the crowd, the panic or
indiscipline of only one Marine could have caused the situation to
degenerate into carnage.
Should the current situation in Iraq ever reach the point where
hostile crowds and nervous troops meet on a regular basis, it is
uncertain that events will go as well as they did in An Numaniyah.
If such encounters do recur with less successful outcomes, it is likely
that resistance to the U.S. presence could increase substantially.
It is also likely that various clerics would issue fatwas calling for
resistance to the U.S. presence, perhaps by force of arms.
Moreover, the nucleus for anti-Western organizations already
exists. Shi’ite organizations such as al Dawa that waged an
underground struggle against Saddam during the years of tyranny
are both extreme and predisposed to violence. No other form of
Shi’ite organization (say a collection of moderates or reformers)
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would have challenged Saddam through terrorism by force of
arms. Only hard core militants had the strength to endure Saddam’s
brutality and continue to fight.
The greatest danger of confrontation is that it might provoke an
intensification of terrorism or even a full scale insurgency. Should
a large element of Iraqi society become mobilized against the U.S.
presence, this could become an exceptionally serious problem.
Most Iraqi males have previously served in the military or militia,
are familiar with small arms, and have some basic military skills.
Moreover, Iraq, even under Saddam, has been an exceptionally wellarmed society. In keeping with Arab concepts of manhood, many
adult males had firearms of some sort, although these weapons
had to be registered with the Iraqi government, and the misuse of
them was severely punished. Also, in the aftermath of the 2003 war,
many Republican Guard, Army, and militia arsenals were looted
placing even larger numbers of weapons into Iraqi society. Looting
and crime that followed the U.S. seizure of Baghdad naturally led a
number of individuals to purchase weapons from the black market
for self-defense.
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Troops Remaining in Iraq.
Nationalist emotion seems to flourish when challenged or
when an external power presents a threat of some kind. Palestinian
nationalism developed rapidly and became angry in response to
Zionism. Kurdish nationalism developed in response to Turkish,
Iraqi, and other attempts to eradicate it. The danger of a new Iraqi
Arab nationalism defining itself as an anti-U.S. force is real, but it
may still be possible to minimize this phenomenon.
Iraqi nationalism is currently in the process of redefining itself
for a post-Saddam world. The chances of this nationalism being
anti-Western and anti-U.S. seem serious. With Saddam’s defeat,
the choice for Iraqis is no longer between his brutality and foreign
rule. The choice may appear to them to be between direct or indirect
foreign rule and rule by indigenous elites, most probably the clergy.
While Shi’ite clerics were among the bitterest enemies of the Saddam
regime, this bitterness has not translated into love of the United
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States or a high level of toleration for U.S. influence in Iraq. With this
in mind, the author provides the following policy guidelines and
recommendations.
1. The United States needs to be continually searching for areas of
agreement with the nonextremist clergy while recognizing issues and
activities upon which collaboration is not possible. It is natural and
useful for the United States to encourage secular and liberal trends
in Iraq. Yet, if the United States attempts to circumvent the religious
Shi’ites, there is a risk that we will appear to be denying the clerics
their due. It is interesting that the Shi’ite clergy was able to maintain
itself as a source of at least some authority throughout the Saddam
Hussein years. If Saddam, with his unlimited capacity for brutality,
had to coexist with it, then it is unrealistic to think that U.S. power
can eliminate clerical influence in politics. Moreover, the United
States, as a non-Muslim power, will be at a severe disadvantage in
attempting to explain actions that the Shi’ite clergy label as hostile
to Islam. Rather, the United States may have to show its concerns
for Iraqi citizens with strong aid programs. These programs may be
coordinated with the clergy but never ceded to their control.
2. The United States should continue to support a strong information
campaign directed at the Iraqi citizenry. Views that the United States
seeks to wipe out or Americanize Islam are widespread in the Arab
World and need to be refuted by both an information campaign and
the conduct of U.S. troops. It has already been noted that some Iraqis
are concerned about U.S. forces bringing vice, bad morals, alcohol,
and sexually transmitted diseases into the country. All possible effort
should be made to refute the stereotype of U.S. troops as a threat to
Muslim morals. It might even be useful for U.S. troops not to eat or
drink water too publicly during Ramadan as a gesture of solidarity.
Any U.S. military collaboration with Christian proselytizing risks a
severe backlash.
3. The United States should maintain and expand efforts to challenge
Iranian activities in the area while continuing to point out the differences
between Iraqi and Iranian interests. Respecting Islam does not require
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U.S. forces to tolerate Iranian infiltration across the border or let
Iranian propaganda go unchallenged. U.S. efforts to interdict Badr
Corps operatives are important and should be continued. Also, as
noted earlier in this work, Iran would probably see a number of
advantages in the dismemberment of Iraq and its corresponding
collapse as a major Arab state. This prospect and other potential
anti-Arab agendas may be worth pointing out publicly as a
counterpoint to Iranian anti-U.S. charges. Furthermore, a continuing
U.S. information campaign in general is vital to reaching the Iraqi
population. Such a campaign will need to confront aggressively the
many conspiracy theories that arise on their own as well as those
which become prominent through Iranian encouragement.
4. U.S. troops must never be allowed to treat the Iraqis as ungrateful
wards. A natural cultural conflict between U.S. troops and Iraqi
civilians might also be expected over the issues of both gratitude
and values. U.S. troops have been told that they have liberated a
long-suffering people from the clutches of a bloodthirsty tyrant.
This is true, but by internalizing this fact, U.S. troops may at some
level expect a population that is passive, dependent, and grateful.
This is an illusion. U.S. troops are dealing with a proud people
who are still not certain that their liberation was the result of U.S.
altruistic motives. The United States must avoid any acts that may
symbolically imply U.S. sovereignty over Iraq. Moreover, Iraqis, like
most other Arabs, are highly sensitive to status. They will notice and
take offense should they be treated in an arrogant or condescending
manner. Additionally, American and Arab ways of understanding
a problem are often so different that little can be assumed when the
two work together. It is correspondingly important to discuss any
joint plans or projects in detail to insure that misunderstandings do
not take place.
5. Extensive detail work needs to be maintained and expanded to avoid
conflict between U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians. One of the most serious
dangers facing U.S. soldiers is that patterns of confrontation may
develop between U.S. troops and nationalist militants seeking to
end the U.S. presence. U.S. troops must understand the need to opt
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out of such confrontations with Iraqis when there is a way to do so.
When possible, U.S. troops need to develop friendly relations with
neighborhood leaders. Proper liaison with local leaders will help
efforts to settle grievances before they reach the level of confrontation
and are important. Additionally, military intelligence units will need
to keep local commanders informed about groups that are seeking to
confront the United States over legitimate grievances and those that
are seeking excuses to confront the United States in an effort to incite
opinion against the U.S. presence.
6. Troops that remain in Iraq will need extensive training in the conduct
of occupation duties. U.S. Army combat troops and U.S. Marines are
often trained in the aggressive use of force to deal with an enemy.
Force as a last resort may not be a principle high in their concerns
and priorities due to past training and background. Winning a war
and maintaining peace in a post-conflict environment are different
skills with different approaches about when to use force. Those
without a background in occupation duty may need immediate
support from mobile training teams. Deescalating confrontational
situations rather than escalating them is of course essential.
7. U.S. forces need to be careful and precise about what they mean by the
term “de-Baathification.” “De-Baathification” is a concept borrowed
from the post-World War II context of de-Nazification, where the
United States sought to uproot an ideology based on race hatred and
dictatorship. In the case of the Baath, as noted earlier, some aspects
of ideology such as an equality of religions and secularization are
not in conflict with basic human values. What is in conflict is the way
in which Saddam Hussein used the Baath party as an instrument of
social control and a justification for dictatorship. “De-Saddamization”
and if possible “democratication” are probably more useful words
to describe U.S. goals. U.S. leaders also need to make clear that deBaathification does not mean that the United States opposes a strong
and restored Arab World in favor of a divided and impoverished
Arab society. The United States is not against an Arab renaissance.
8. The United States needs to expand the numbers of foreign Arab
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and Muslim troops involved with the management of postwar Iraq. Their
presence in Iraq for postwar security duties could also be very
valuable in convincing Iraqis that the United States is not interested
in severing them from the larger Arab World. Such a deployment
would have to be coordinated with responsible Iraqi leaders.
Moreover, many Arab and Muslim countries would probably
be willing to contribute to a postwar stabilization force if it was
authorized by the United Nations. While the United States may have
to help finance such a force, it would be worth the expense to reduce
the danger of U.S. confrontations with the population and assuage
Iraqi fears of U.S. domination.
Finally, the United States has a reputation in the Arab World
of favoring democracy so long as the democratic process produces
leaders acceptable to Western interests. Advocating democracy and
dictating who can be elected are two different concepts. One of the
clearest ways the United States can avoid a nationalist backlash is
to recognize that ousting Saddam Hussein has not earned for us
the privilege of dominating Iraq for the indefinite future. If U.S.
leaders believe that it does, then the United States has truly become
a colonial power that will inevitably face colonial wars.
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